Electing a committee with dominance constraints by Ianovski, Egor
ar
X
iv
:1
90
2.
05
90
9v
5 
 [c
s.G
T]
  3
0 M
ay
 20
19
Electing a committee with dominance
constraints
Egor Ianovski⋆
International Laboratory of Game Theory and Decision Making, National Research
University Higher School of Economics, St Petersburg
Abstract. We consider the problem of electing a committee of k candi-
dates, subject to some constraints as to what this committee is supposed
to look like. In our framework, the candidates are given labels as an
abstraction of gender, religion, ethnicity, and other attributes, and the
election outcome is constrained by interval constraints – of the form “Be-
tween 3 and 5 candidates with label X” – and dominance constraints –
“At least as many candidates with label X as with label Y”. While in
general this problem would require us to rethink how we determine which
election outcomes are good, in the case of a committee scoring rule this
becomes a constrained optimisation problem – simply find a valid com-
mittee with the highest score. In the case of weakly separable rules we
show the existence of a polynomial time solution in the case of tree-like
constraints, and a fixed-parameter tractable algorithm for the general
case, which is otherwise NP-hard.
1 Introduction
Perhaps the least controversial desideratum in social choice theory in social
choice theory is non-imposition – the requirement that every candidate can be
a winner in at least one profile. Indeed, it is hard to come up with a convincing
story why an election designer should allow voters to vote for a, while eliminat-
ing even the theoretical possibility of a winning, unless he is actively trying to
provoke a revolution.
The situation changes when we consider multiwinner elections. When electing
assemblies, parliaments, and committees (or, indeed, “electing” a movie library
or a package of advertisements) we often encounter constitutional or conven-
tional restrictions on which sets are acceptable and which are not. This could be
due to equity concerns, such as the twenty-four countries around the world that
reserve seats for women; protection of minority rights, such as the religious seats
in Iran or the ethnic seats in Croatia; social stability, such as the Columbian
peace agreement which reserved seats for former FARC combatants, or the Ro-
man requirement that one consul be a pleb; credibility, such as the bipartisan
committees in the United States, or the Cypriot Supreme Court which requires
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a Greek, Turkish, and a neutral judge; protection of culture, such as the French
law requiring that forty percent of songs sung on radio are in French; and many
others.
This creates difficulties for social choice theory because such constraints are
exogenous to the standard framework. A multiwinner election typically has ac-
cess to a list of candidates, and the voters’ preferences over them. The candidates
are just a list of names, and any sensible function will treat them symmetrically.
The function does not have access to the fact that failing to elect a will cause
the army to secede and let the barbarians through the gates. Even if we have
access to such constraints, however, the remains the perennial problem of social
choice – out of all the committees that satisfy the constraints, clearly we want
the best one. But what does that mean?
In this paper we will make a start on this problem by suggesting a framework
for specifying constraints on committee composition, and considering how such a
committee may be elected under a given committee scoring rule. The advantage
of using a scoring rule in this instance is that it offers a clear answer to how to
determine which election outcomes are desirable – if we believe that the score
produced by the voting rule is indeed a reasonable measure of social welfare,
then the problem is simply to find a committee satisfying the constraints which
maximises this score.
1.1 Related work
Committee scoring rules were first introduced by [5], in which the authors iden-
tify the classes of weakly separable and representation-focused rules, and study
the properties committee selection rules might be expected to satisfy with respect
to three possible applications. Weakly separable rules are found to be tractable
for reasonable underlying single-winner functions, while representation-focused
rules in general are NP-hard, following from the results of [16,2,15].
A third class, the top-k counting rules, was introduced by [7] in the context of
finding a multiwinner analogue of the fixed-majority criterion. Ordered weighted
average operators where introduced by [9], which led to the superclass of ordered
weighted average rules [18], and the relationship between these classes and their
axiomatic properties was studied by [6].
The notion that the outcome of a multiwinner election may be restricted to
a set of admissible committees is not in itself new, and has been present in the
approval-voting literature [11,12]. The specific question of how to optimise the
score of a committee subject to range constraints was studied by [3]. They present
approximation algorithms for submodular scoring functions, while for separable
scores they present exact solutions for problems with simple label structures
and hardness results otherwise. Independently, [4] introduce a very similar model
where they present approximation algorithms for submodular scores. The work of
[1] considers the question of how to elect a committee if the constraints cannot be
satisfied, and presents an algorithm for finding an ordinally-optimal committee
that comes the closest to satisfying the constraints. Also related is the work on
apportionment of [13] which considers how to apportion seats with an arbitrary
number of diversity constraints.
1.2 Our contribution
We extend the models of [3] and [4] by introducing dominance constraints, and
show that the constrained election problem with these constraints for disjoint
labels is solvable in polynomial time if the dominance relation is tree-like and
NP-hard in the general case. For arbitrary label structures, we show that the
problem is fixed-parameter tractable in the number of labels.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Committee scoring rules
Let [m] be the set of integers {1, . . . ,m}, and [m]k be the set of all length-k
increasing sequences of numbers from [m]. Given two sequences, I = (i1, ..., ik)
and J = (j1, ..., jk), we write I  J if for each t ∈ [k], it holds that it ≥ jt.
An election, E, is a triple (C, V, k) consisting of a set of candidates, C, a set
of voters, V , and a committee size k. Every voter is identified with a linear order
over C, which we call a preference order. We use posvi(c), c ∈ C, to denote the
position of c in vi’s preference order. A committee selection rule is a function
which takes an election to a subset of candidates of size k, which we call a
k-committee.
For a k-committee X , we use posvi(X) to denote the sequence that we obtain
by sorting the set {posvi(c) | c ∈ X} in increasing order. Naturally, posvi(c) ∈
[m] and posvi(X) ∈ [m]k.
The class of committee selection rules we are interested in operates by as-
signing a number of points to each committee for each voter, where the number
of points assigned to X for voter i is a function of posvi(X).
Definition 1. A committee scoring function for m candidates and committee
size k is a function fm,k : [m]k → R
+ such that, for any sequences I, J ∈ [m]k,
if I  J then fm,k(I) ≥ fm,k(J).
Let f = (fm,k)k≤m be a family of committee scoring functions. The induced
committee scoring rule is a function Rf that given an election E and an integer
k outputs all k-committees that maximise scoreE(X) =
∑
vi∈V
fm,k(posvi(X)).
[6] identify a hierarchy of such rules. They get hard very quickly: of the
three classes at the bottom – weakly separable, top-k counting, representation-
focused – only weakly separable rules are polynomial-time computable in the
general case,1 and the top-k counting and representation-focused rules known
to be easy are thus because of their similarity to weakly separable rules. Since
our focus in this paper is computational, we will only concern ourselves with
separable rules.
1 Subject to assumptions about the underlying scoring functions being polynomial-
time computable
Definition 2. We say that a family of committee scoring functions f = (fm,k)k≤m
is weakly separable if there exists a family of single-winner scoring functions
(γm,k)k≤m with γm,k : [m]→ R
+ such that for everym ∈ N and every (i1, ..., ik) ∈
[m]k we have:
fm,k(i1, ..., ik) =
k∑
t=1
γm,k(it).
A committee scoring rule Rf is weakly separable if it is defined through a
family of weakly separable scoring functions f .
Note that weakly separable rules, as the name suggests, allow the score of a
committee to be separated. By this we mean:
scoreE(X) =
∑
vi∈V
fm,k(posvi(X))
=
∑
vi∈V
∑
j∈X
γm,k(posvi(j))
=
∑
j∈X
∑
vi∈V
γm,k(posvi(j)).
We will thus refer to
∑
vi∈V
γm,k(posvi(j)) as the score of j, or scoreE(j).
Natural examples of weakly separable rules are those where the underlying
scoring rules are the familiar scoring rules of social choice theory. For example,
Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) is the committee scoring rule with the
plurality underlying scoring function, γm,k(1) = 1, γm,k(i 6= 1) = 0; Borda count
is the committee scoring rule derived from the Borda function, γm,k(i) = m− i;
and Bloc is the rule derived from k-approval, γm,k(i) = 1 for i ≤ k.
2.2 Range restrictions
In the most general sense, a restriction on the range of a committee selection
rule would take the form of some set S ⊆ 2C of viable committees, with the
requirement that the rule always output a member of S. However from a com-
putational point of view such an approach is neither tenable nor interesting – if
S is large, then listing the admissible sets as input is impractical; if S is small,
then the problem of finding the highest scoring committee can be trivially solved
by trying every committee in S. An alternative approach could be to describe S
as a formula in some logical language, ϕS . This solves the problem of triviality
and input size, but if the language is rich enough to capture propositional logic
then the satisfaction problem will already be NP-hard, and we will have hit a
wall before we even started.
Moreover, it does not seem to me that we need such a level of generality at all.
The constraints used in practice tend to be very simple – allocating a number of
seats (e.g., 26 bishops in the House of Lords), setting a lower bound (at least one
Pleb consul), or establishing parity between groups (as many Democrats as Re-
publicans). Most of these can be captured through the use of interval constraints
[3][4], i.e. setting a numerical lower and upper bound on the number of candi-
dates of a certain type. In this paper we also introduce dominance constraints,
which will allow us to require that one group has at least as many candidates as
another, without recourse to exact numbers.
This gives us our constraints:
– Interval(p, q,X) : between p and q members of the committee from X .
– Dominance(X,Y ) : at least as many members of the committee are from X
as from Y .
We can now define the algorithmic problems of interest.
Definition 3. The constrained winner election problem for a committee scoring
rule R is the problem that takes an election E, a set of constraints C, and a set
of labels Λ = λ1, . . . , λp ⊆ C as input. The output is some k-committee X that
maximises the score out of all the committees that satisfy C.
The constrained winner existence problem for a committee scoring rule R is
the problem that takes an election E, a set of constraints C, a set of labels Λ,
and a target score S as input. The output is YES if there exists a k-committee
X that satisfies C and has score at least S, and NO otherwise.
Unfortunately, if Λ is arbitrary then simply determining whether there exists
a committee satisfying C is NP-hard.
Proposition 1. It is NP-hard to determine whether there exists a committee X
satisfying a set of constraints C. Thus the constrained winner existence problem
is NP-complete for any onto committee selection rule.
Proof. Hardness for interval constraints has been established by [3] and [4]. For
dominance constraints, we reduce from vertex cover. Construct an election with
a candidate for every vertex in the graph, c1, . . . , cm. Define a label for every
edge in the graph, consisting of the vertices incident on the edge, and a la-
bel for every singleton candidate. For every edge e, introduce the constraints
Dominance(e, {c1}), . . . ,Dominance(e, {cm}). Since at least one candidate must
be elected to form a size k committee, the constraints establish that at least one
vertex from every edge must be chosen.
We will thus need to impose some structure on the admissible lists of labels
to proceed. We consider two natural cases: where the labels are disjoint (corre-
sponding to the 1-layered case of [3], and the ∆ = 1 case of [4]), and where there
is only a small number of labels.
3 Disjoint labels and knapsack
We note that the dominance constraints impose an ordering on the labels – if we
imagine we are building the committee one candidate at a time, andX dominates
Y , then we must take a candidate from X before we take one from Y . If there
are several labels dominating Y in this order, we will have to take candidates
from all of them. As such the problem is reminiscent of partial-order knapsack
where, in addition to weights, values, and a knapsack constraint, the input also
has a partial order on the items and the requirement that the chosen knapsack
be closed under the predecessor relation. In our case the relation is a preorder,
since it is possible for X and Y to dominate each other (thus requring that
the committee has the same number of candidates from X and Y ), but, since a
preorder generalises a partial order, the strong NP-completeness of partial order
knapsack ([10]) carries over to our case as well.
Theorem 1. The constrained winner existence problem for weakly separable vot-
ing rules with disjoint labels is NP-complete, even for SNTV.
For Bloc, it is NP-complete even with a constant number of voters.
Proof. Let (G, k) be an instance of clique, G = (V , E). Define an SNTV elec-
tion with a candidate for every vertex and every edge. For every edge candidate
ei, define a voter that ranks ei first and the rest arbitrarily. The set of la-
bels is the set of singletons. For every ei = (v1, v2) ∈ E , add the constraints
Dominance({v1}, {ei}) and Dominance({v2}, {ei}). We claim that there’s a win-
ning committee of size k+ k(k− 1)/2 with score k(k− 1)/2, if and only if G has
a clique of size k.
First observe that the requirement that ei = (v1, v2) is on a committee only
if v1 and v2 are on the committee establishes that the committee is a subgraph
– edges cannot be present without their incident vertices. From this we can
establish that no committee of size k+k(k−1)/2 can have more than k(k−1)/2
points, as that would represent a graph with at least k(k − 1)/2 + 1 edges and
at most k − 1 vertices.
In order to have k(k − 1)/2 points, then, we need to have k vertices and
k(k − 1)/2 edges, and this can only be a complete graph of order k, that is to
say a clique.
For Bloc, we first claim that clique remains hard if we restrict ourselves to
the case where a clique of size k contains at least half the edges of the graph,
i.e. 2
(
k
2
)
≥
(
|V|
2
)
. To see that this is the case, given an instance of clique (G, k)
expand G into G′ by adding 3|V| new vertices, adjacent to each other and to
every vertex in |V|. Clearly, G′ contains a clique of size k+ 3|V| if and only if G
contains a clique of size k, and one can verify that 2
(
k+3|V|
2
)
≥
(
4|V|
2
)
for k ≥ 2.
Consider then an instance of clique with 2
(
k
2
)
≥
(
|V|
2
)
. Define a candidate for
every vertex, a candidate for every edge, and k+ k(k− 1)/2 dummy candidates.
Define one voter that ranks k(k − 1)/2 edges in the top positions in any order,
then the dummy candidates, then the other candidates. The second voter will
rank the remaining edges first, then the dummy candidates, then the other candi-
dates. Add the constraint Interval(0, 0, D) for the label of dummy candidates D,
and Dominance({v1}, e), Dominance({v2}, e) for every edge e = (v1, v2). From
hereon replicate the argument for SNTV.
We include the argument for Bloc because Bloc also belongs to a class of
rules known as top-k counting ([7]), and while such rules are hard to solve in
general, a wide class of them are fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the
number of voters. Here we see that the constrained problem is hard even with a
constant number.
The fact that partial-order knapsack is hard, of course, is not surprising
since knapsack by itself is already NP-complete. What is key here is that while
knapsack is solvable in pseudopolynomial time, i.e. can be solved in polynomial
time if all the weights are polynomial in the size of the input, the proof above
establishes hardness even if all the weights are zero or one.
However, [10] showed the existence of a pseudopolynomial time solution for
partial-order knapsack if the partial order is a forest. If we assume a similar re-
striction in the constrained winner problem, we will be able to construct partial-
order knapsack where the weights are polynomial in the size of the constrained
winner instance, and this will show the existence of a polynomial time solution
for the constrained winner problem.
Definition 4. The exact partial-order knapsack problem takes as input a set
of items, (v1, w1), . . . , (vn, wn), a partial order on the items , and a knapsack
constraint W . The output is a subset X of items closed under predecessor with
respect to , with
∑
(vi,wi)∈X
wi = W and maximal
∑
(vi,wi)∈X
vi.
Proposition 2 ([10]). If there do not exist distinct x, y, z such that x  y,
z  y, and x is incomparable with z, then exact partial-order knapsack is solvable
in time polynomial in n,W .2
In the case of constrained elections we can generalise this slightly as we do
not require the preordering of labels to be a strict forest, but a forest modulo
cliques – equivalently, the partial order on equivalence classes is a forest. Cases
like λ1 ∼ λ2  λ3 will not break the result.
Theorem 2. Let  represent the preorder induced by the Dominance constraints,
and Ei denote the equivalence class of λi with respect to . A set of constraints
is said to be sylvan if there do not exist distinct Ei, Ej , Er for which Ei  Ej,
Er  Ej, and Ei is incomparable with Er.
The constrained winner selection problem for a weakly separable voting rule
with disjoint labels and sylvan constraints is solvable in polynomial time.
Proof. Construct a directed graphGwith vertices Λ and arcs Dominance(λi, λj) ∈
C. Take the transitive closure of G – note that the arcs of the resulting graph
are precisely the preorder .
In every λi, order the candidates in terms of their score, breaking ties arbi-
trarily. We say that the jth candidate in this ordering has rank j. Sort G topolog-
ically, and starting with the topologically first i consider every pair (λi, λj) ∈ G.
If |λj | > |λi|, delete the |λj | − |λi| lowest rank elements of λj .
For every Interval(p, q, λi ∈ C, first delete the |λj |− q lowest rank candidates
from all λj for which (λi, λj) ∈ G.
2 [10] do not consider the exact variant, but the dynamic programming solution can
be modified to handle it in the standard way.
Second, initialise a function r : Λ → N to r(λi) = 0. For every λj for which
(λj , λi) ∈ G, update r(λj) = max(p, r(λj)). Remove the r(λi) highest rank
candidates from all λi and put them into a set Y . Note that in removing these
candidates we do not change the rank of the remaining candidates.
Collapse every clique into a single vertex. Where a clique λ1, . . . , λp is col-
lapsed in such a way, populate this clique with the p-tuples {(c1, . . . , cp) | ci ∈
λi, rank(c1) = · · · = rank(cp)}. The rank of a p-tuple is the rank of its elements.
For every singleton c in the graph, create an item with weight 1 and value
equal to the score of c. For every p-tuple, create an item with weight p and
value equal to the sum of the scores in the p-tuple. Define a partial order on
the items by setting x ≥ y if and only if x ∈ λi, y ∈ λj , (λi, λj) ∈ E , and
rank(x) = rank(y). To complete the exact partial-order knapsack instance, the
knapsack capacity will be k.
The above construction is polynomial time. The transitive closure can be
found in polynomial time, e.g. with the FloydWarshall algorithm, clique detec-
tion in a transitive graph reduces to cycle detection, and the other operations
are clearly polynomial. The end result is a partial-order knapsack instance where
the largest weight of an item is bounded above by the largest clique size, or |Λ|,
which is polynomial in the size of the input. Thus this instance can be solved
in polynomial time. It remains to show how the solution gives us an election
winner.
Recall that Y is the set of candidates removed for the lower bounds of the
interval constraints. Let β = scoreE(Y ). We will now show that if X is a solution
to the knapsack instance with value α then X ∪ Y is a k-committee satisfying C
with a score of α+ β, and that if X is a k-committee satisfying C with a score
of α + β then there exists a solution X ′ to the knapsack instance with value at
least α. This will establish that an optimal solution to the knapsack instance
can be used to obtain a constrained election winner by adding the candidates in
Y .
Suppose that X is a solution to the knapsack instance with value α. Ob-
serve that every element in G had weight equal to the number of candidates
it represented, so X ∪ Y is indeed a k-committee. It is clear that the score of
X ∪ Y is α + β, it remains to show that X ∪ Y satisfies C. The upper bound
of Interval(p, q, λi) is satisfied because we removed all but q candidates from all
such λi. The lower bounds are satisfied by virtue of the candidates in Y . For
the Dominance(λi, λj) constraints, observe that if x is in the knapsack, then so
is its entire ≥-predecessor chain until the initial element, x1. If x1 belongs to
a vertex in G with zero in-degree, then this chain satisfies all the constraints
imposed by the arcs on the graph. If on the other hand x1 belongs to vertex A,
and (B,A) ∈ G, then it must be the case that the vertex with the same rank as
x1, x0, has been removed from B. Since x0 will be added to the committee from
Y , it will still serve to satisfy the constraints.
Suppose that X is a k-committee satisfying C with a score of α + β. Recall
that r : Λ→ N is the function telling us how many members from λi are removed
and put into Y . Since X satisfies C, it follows that X must contain at least r(λi)
members of each label λi. For every λi, remove the r(λi) highest rank elements
of λi from X . By construction, the combined score of all these elements is at
most β, and so the resulting rump committee X ′ has score α′ ≥ α.
To obtain a knapsack solution from X ′, simply take the |X ′ ∩ λi| highest
rank candidates from all λi, and this solution has value at least α as required.
4 Small number of labels and fixed-parameter tractability
If the number of label is slow we can obtain a polynomial time solution via
mixed integer linear programming, using similar techniques to the result for
top-k counting rules by [7] and Theorem 10 of [3].
Theorem 3. The constrained winner election problem for weakly separable rules
is fixed parameter tractable with respect to the number of labels.
Proof. Intuitively, if the number of labels is constant this problem can be solved
by brute force. Observe that if X is a committee satisfying constraints C, then if
x ∈ X , y /∈ Y , scoreE(y) > scoreE(x) and for all labels λi, x ∈ λi if and only if
y ∈ λi, then Y = (X \ {x}) ∪ {y} is also a committee satisfying the constraints,
and scoreE(Y ) ≥ scoreE(X). In other words if two candidates have the same
labels, we will never violate a constraint by swapping a low scoring one for a
high scoring one, and doing so will only increase the score.
Since a constant p sets gives rise to a Venn diagram with a constant q regions,
we need only consider all ways of choosing the best k candidates from every
region, of which there are at most kq.
To obtain a fixed parameter tractable algorithm, we will recast the intuition
above as a mixed integer linear program. Such a program is fixed parameter
tractable in p if the number of integer variables is a function of p alone ([14]).
Let D1, . . . , Dq enumerate the regions of the Venn diagram induced by Λ.
Note that q ≤ 2p. Introduce the integer variables d1, . . . , dq, the interpretation
of di being the number of elements taken from Di. Introduce the real indicator
variables (si,j)i≤q,j≤k with the interpretation that si,j = 1 if and only if at least
j elements are taken from Di..
The constant values ci,j will represent the score of the jth highest scoring
candidate from Di. The resulting system is in fig. 1.
Constraint 1 ensures the committee is of size k, constraints 2 ans 3 ensure
the satisfaction of C, and constraint 4 establishes the relation between the di
variables and the objective function. Clearly if the system arrives at a solution
where all si,j are integral, we have found a maximal score k-committee.
Suppose then that the solution is such that there exists a 0 < si,j < 1. Since∑
j≤k si,j = di, and di is an integer, it follows there exists another 0 < si,j′ < 1.
Without loss of generality, let j′ > j. Since ci,j ≥ ci,j′ by definition, the value
of the solution will not decrease if we transfer the weight from si,j′ to si,j ,
after which we will have reduced the number of non-integral values by one. By
repeating this process for each non-integral si,j , we will find an integral solution
with the same value.
max
∑
i≤q
∑
j≤k
si,jci,j
s.t.
1)
∑
i≤q
di = k,
2)
∑
Dj⊆λi
dj ≥ r,
∑
Dj⊆λi
dj ≤ t, for all Interval(r, t, λi)
3)
∑
Dj⊆λi
dj ≥
∑
Dj⊆λt
dj, for all Dominance(λi, λr)
4)
∑
i≤q
∑
j≤k
si,j = di,
5) 0 ≤ si,j ≤ 1, i ≤ q, j ≤ k
Fig. 1. A mixed integer formulation of the constrained winner problem. Integer vari-
ables in typewriter font.
5 Future directions
The work of [3], [4], and the present work all reduce to optimising a certain objec-
tive function over the space of viable committees. This model is both amenable
to an algorithmic approach and has a ready economic interpretation in terms of
utility maximisation, but is at odds with the standard model of voting in social
choice theory which is purely ordinal. In this paper we have interpreted this
approach as optimising the ordinal ranking that is the outcome of the cardinal
scores of a scoring rule, but scoring rules are just one of many voting procedures
that can be used to elect a committee.
A purely ordinal model is used by [1], but it is a very specific one – we
are given a global preference order over the candidate and have to choose an
optimal committee accordingly. This could be interpreted as optimising a best-k
rule in the sense of [5]. It would be interesting to see what could be done for
more general varieties of committee selection rules, such as the Condorcet-based
approaches of [8] and [17].
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